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18 THE MODERN AMERICAN 
A CASE FOR REPARATIONS: THE PLIGHT OF THE AFRICAN-
AMERICAN WORLD WAR II VETERAN CONCERNING FEDERAL 
DISCRIMINATORY HOUSING PRACTICES 
 
By LaDavia S. Hatcher * 
I n 1997, thousands of people celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Levittown suburb in Long Island, New York.1  How-ever, the happiness shared by the community who moved 
into Levittown in 1947 was not shared by the over one million 
African-American World War II veterans,2 most of whom were 
systematically locked out of Federal Housing Authority (“FHA”) 
and Veterans Authority (“VA”) funded communities because of 
the color of their skin.3 
Although VA loans made housing assistance available to 
African-American World War II veterans, the federal govern-
ment supported FHA insurance policies that made it nearly im-
possible for VA loans to be insured for African Americans.4  
This practice began with the 1944 enactment of the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act5 and continued until President Kennedy’s 
1962 Executive Order that renounced federally funded housing 
with restrictive covenants.6 
By the mid 1970s, 11 million Americans had purchased 
homes through FHA-VA financing.7  Yet, an overwhelmingly 
large percentage of the 11 million homes that were federally-
insured and federally-guaranteed were acquired by, and limited 
to, ownership by White Americans.8  Therefore, as a result of 
racial restrictions, less than 2% of the housing financed and in-
sured with federal mortgage assistance was available to African 
Americans.9  In fact, World War II African-American service-
men still remember the pain caused by federal financed restric-
tive covenants.10  During a 1997 interview commemorating the 
Levittown anniversary, World War II veteran Eugene Burnett 
stated, “The anniversary leaves me cold . . . . [W]hen I hear 
‘Levittown’ what rings in my mind is when the salesman said: 
‘It’s not me, you see, but the owners of this development have 
not as yet decided whether they’re going to sell these homes to 
Negroes.’”11 
This article presents the arguments and substance of a pro-
posed reparations statute to address the federal government’s 
housing discrimination practices, which led to systematic hous-
ing prejudice toward over one million African Americans that 
fought in World War II. 
HISTORY 
The long history of housing discrimination has had a lasting 
effect on African-American communities.12  Housing is the larg-
est component of wealth for most American families.13  How-
ever, African Americans are less likely to be homeowners and 
their homes tend to be less valuable than those of White Ameri-
cans.14  This disparity can be traced back to deliberate govern-
ment policies and programs that predominantly provided home-
ownership for White Americans.15  Although all African Ameri-
cans were prejudicially targeted as unworthy for federal housing 
assistance, this article focuses on the narrow group of African-
American World War II veterans who were statutorily entitled to 
federal financing through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 
194416, but were denied these entitlements because of their race. 
The Roosevelt administration created the New Deal legisla-
tion, a portion of which sought societal stability by making con-
tinued homeownership a reality.17 The Home Owners Loan Cor-
poration (“HOLC”), the FHA, and the VA implemented this leg-
islation.18  The HOLC, which provided longer term and fully 
amortized mortgages, came into being in the 1930s.19  Thereaf-
ter, the FHA was created.20  However, unlike the HOLC, the 
FHA insured federal mortgage loans instead of making mortgage 
loans.21  Since home loans were now insured by the FHA, lend-
ers were willing to make loans on terms that were acceptable by 
the FHA.22  Then the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 
created the VA, offering federally financed mortgage loans to 
World War II veterans.23  To the dismay of African-American 
servicemen, the administration of VA loans conformed to the 
attitudes and accepted the procedures of the FHA.24  The FHA 
used its biased discretion to decide which loans it would insure.  
As a result, loans in “high-risk” areas, such as urban communi-
ties and inharmonious racial areas, would most likely not be in-
sured.  Thus, in order to make certain that its loans were insured, 
the VA complacently conformed to the FHA’s prejudice. 
 In essence, from its conception, the FHA set itself up as the 
protector of the all-White-American neighborhood by imple-
menting several racially restrictive policies.  One policy focused 
on specific appraisal standards in the FHA Underwriting Manual.  
The manual blatantly instructed that “the presence of inharmoni-
ous racial or nationality groups made a neighborhood’s housing 
undesirable for insurance.”25  Moreover, the underwriting explic-
itly recommended racially restrictive covenants and warned, “[I]f 
a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that proper-
ties should continue to be occupied by the same social and racial 
classes.”26  Thus, although racially restrictive covenants were 
made judicially unenforceable after Shelley v. Kraemer,27  the 
FHA and VA continued to require the covenants.28  In fact, 
Franklin D. Richards, the FHA commissioner during Shelley, 
stated that the court’s action would “in no way affect the pro-
grams of [the FHA].”29 
 In response to advocacy by the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People and Presidential intervention, 
the FHA lifted its ban against integration. In 1949, FHA officials 
announced that the FHA would refuse to issue mortgage insur-
ance on properties bound by racially restrictive covenants re-
corded after February 15, 1950.30   Nevertheless, FHA officials 
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publicly announced that the newly adopted policy in no way 
encouraged open occupancy.31  In a clearly prejudicial effort to 
encourage federally funded housing discrimination, the execu-
tive board of the FHA agreed that “it should be made entirely 
clear that violation [of the new rules] would not invalidate insur-
ance.”32  Consequently, both the Truman and Eisenhower presi-
dential administrations rejected requests to bar FHA aid to any 
segregated housing.33 
 It was not until President Kennedy issued Executive Order 
11,063 that the government considered federal assistance for 
housing that excluded people because of their race, color, or 
creed unfair and against the public policy of the United States.34 
Furthermore, it was only after there seemed to be no hope for 
the World War II-generation minorities seeking federally fi-
nanced homeownership that President Kennedy issued the or-
der.35  Therefore, although the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act 
of 1944 made federally financed home loans exclusively avail-
able to World War II veterans, these loans were not available to 
African-American veterans for at least two and a half decades.  
As a result, a lasting dent was impressed into their wealth port-
folios and overall future advancements. 
 While, federally encouraged racial restrictive covenants did 
appear to end in 1962, the effects of the prejudice live on today 
in the form of lost opportunities, wealth, and property accumula-
tion.  Acclaimed authors Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro 
stated it best when they described the plight of African Ameri-
cans as follows:  
[L]ocked out of the greatest mass-based opportunity 
for wealth accumulation in American history, African 
Americans who desired and were able to afford home 
ownership found themselves consigned to central-city 
communities where their investments were affected by 
the self-fulfilling prophecies of the FHA appraisers: 
cut off from sources of new investment, their homes 
and communities deteriorated and lost value in com-
parison to those homes and communities that FHA 
appraisers deemed desirable.36 
BASIC APPROACH TO THE CONCEPT OF REPARATIONS  
 Before presenting why reparations are owed to African-
American World War II veterans, it is important to place the 
concept of reparations into perspective by breaking it down into 
its essential parts.  Historically, the term “reparations” takes on a 
different definition for different people in different cultures.  
Nevertheless, a constant theme in reparations is the concept of 
human injustice.  In his anthology, The Age of Apology, Roy 
Brooks captures the ideas of many by describing reparations as, 
“responses that seek atonement for the commission of an injus-
tice.”37  Furthermore, Brooks defines human injustice as, “the 
violation or suppression of human rights or fundamental free-
doms recognized by international law.”38  For this article, the 
concept of reparations will be generally defined as a response 
that seeks atonement for the commission of an injustice that is a 
violation or suppression of human rights or fundamental free-
doms recognized by international law. 
 However, before an argument for reparations can be as-
serted, there are five prerequisites for a meritorious reparations 
claim: (1) a human injustice has been committed; (2) the human 
injustice is well documented; (3) the victims are a distinct group 
that is identifiable; (4) the current members of the group con-
tinue to be harmed; (5) and the harm is causally connected to the 
injustice.39  After a meritorious claim is presented, the decision 
as to appropriate redress follows.  Examples of such redress in-
clude apologies, apologies with payment, payment without 
apologies, and the investment of money or services into the 
communities of the harmed groups.40  The events that cause the 
need for reparations are sometimes ignited by racism, power, 
greed, or complacency.  This article argues that reparations con-
tinue to serve as the only concrete way to create mass public 
awareness of previous human injustices to prevent human trage-
dies in the future.    
REPARATIONS PARADIGM 
During recent history, redress for injustice has become a 
phenomenon in both the international and national arenas.  
Apologies, sometimes coupled with monetary and non-monetary 
payments for human injustices, have gained both national and 
international momentum.  Brooks calls it the “Age of Apol-
ogy.”41  Yet, the distinction between an apology with payment 
and simple payment is of paramount importance.  The apologies 
by individuals or entities, even without monetary reparations, 
send a message of atonement, whereas offered and paid repara-
tions without more seem to be settlements.  Apologies send a 
message of acknowledgment and a desire to recognize the past 
in order to change the future.  However, the offered and paid 
reparations without apologies appear to be mere settlements to 
quiet the claimants and relieve the perpetrators of liability. 
Domestically, federal and state governments have offered 
apologies and in some instances granted reparations to prejudi-
cially affected groups.  For example, President Clinton apolo-
gized to Hawaiians for the illegal U.S.-aided overthrow of their 
sovereign nation.  Similarly, the federal government offered 
reparations to the African-American victims of the Tuskegee 
syphilis experiment.42  In addition, the U.S. government apolo-
gized and offered limited reparations for Japanese Latin Ameri-
cans kidnapped from Latin American countries and held hostage 
in U.S. internment camps during World War II.43  It also granted 
statutory reparations to Japanese-American survivors of the 
World War II Japanese internments camps.44  Further still, the 
Florida legislature awarded reparations to survivors of the Rose-
wood Massacre.45 
Specifically, the internment of Japanese in America began 
in 1942 under the direction of President Roosevelt, when he 
issued Executive Order 9066.46  The mission of the order was to 
“prescribe military areas from which any or all people may be 
excluded who might threaten national security by sabotage or 
espionage.”47  As a result, 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry 
from the West Coast were evaluated, relocated, and interned by 
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the U.S. military.  Almost two-thirds or over 77,000 of those 
interned were American-born citizens. 
A Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians (“CWRIC”) was set up by the United States Congress 
to consider redress for the Japanese affected by the internment 
orders.48  It provided five recommendations, which were all en-
acted as the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.49  First, CWRIC recom-
mended creation of a joint congressional resolution acknowledg-
ing and apologizing for the wrongs done in 1942.  Second, it 
recommended a presidential pardon for persons convicted of 
violating the statutes establishing and enforcing evacuation and 
incarceration.  Third, it encouraged Congress to instruct the gov-
ernment to deal with applicants for restitution.  Fourth, CWRIC 
recommended that Congress set aside money for the establish-
ment of a special foundation to sponsor research and public edu-
cational activities.”50  Finally, it recommended that Congress 
grant a one time, tax free, per capita compensation of $20,000 to 
each person that survived incarceration.”51 
Then, in 1995, arising from the legal claims of families and 
survivors of the 1923 Rosewood Massacre, the Florida legisla-
ture passed the Rosewood Compensation Act.52  This legislation 
marked the first time in American history that an American ad-
ministration accepted responsibility for 
an act of racial violence committed 
against African Americans.53  Prior to 
the massacre, the town of Rosewood 
was a prosperous oasis for African 
Americans, despite its geographical 
placement in a predominately White-
American county in Florida. The Mas-
sacre began when White-American 
residents of the county believed that an 
African-American man sexually as-
saulted a White-American woman.  
Local and state law enforcers either 
participated or stood by and idly 
watched White-American residents kill 
African-American men, women, and 
children and burned their small town to the ground.54  As a result 
of the violence, Rosewood was literally wiped off the Florida 
state map. 
Although the Florida government did not apologize for the 
massacre, the state acknowledged its responsibility for failing to 
prevent the tragedy and recognized that White Americans were 
responsible for destroying Rosewood.  In addition, the Act re-
quired a criminal investigation and directed state universities to 
conduct research on the Rosewood incident. Monetary repara-
tions were paid to nine survivors of the horrific tragedy in the 
amount of $150,000; while, the 145 decedents of residents were 
paid between $375 and $22,535 for property damage.55  More-
over, in the form of non-monetary reparations, individual educa-
tional grants under the Rosewood Family Scholarship Fund were 
made available.56  The scholarship gives preference to those stu-
dents that are direct descendents of the Rosewood family.57 
These events mark essential published accounts where 
American governmental entities granted and actually paid mone-
tary reparations.  Drawing specifically from the rationales for 
awarding Japanese interment detainees and Rosewood survivors 
statutory reparations, a foundation should be created for the suc-
cessful implementation of a statute granting monetary compensa-
tion and an apology to African-American World War II veterans 
- standing as a definite and concrete apology with tangible 
weight.58 
DEFEATING GENERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST             
AFRICAN-AMERICAN CLAIMS TO REPARATIONS 
Critics of African-American reparations employ legalisms to 
support reparation resistance.59  Specifically, African-American 
reparation opponents present five distinct arguments.  First, they 
argue the statute of limitations has run, asserting that slavery 
happened over one hundred years ago.  Next, they argue the ab-
sence of directly harmed individuals because all ex-slaves have 
been dead for at least a generation.  Third, critics point to the 
absence of individual perpetuators, stating that White Americans 
living today have not injured African Americans and should not 
be required to pay for the sins of their slave master forbearers.  
Fourthly, critics use a lack of direct 
causation argument.  This critique 
states that slavery did not cause the 
present ills of African-American com-
munities.  Last is the indeterminacy of 
compensation amounts.  In this argu-
ment, critics claim that it is impossible 
to determine who should get what and 
how much.60 
     All of the mentioned criticisms are 
legally strong.  However, not one can 
defeat the argument for granting repa-
rations to African-American World 
War II veterans.  For instance, both the 
Japanese internment camp and the 
Rosewood Massacre challenges were 
brought decades after the tragedies.  Thus, the statute of limita-
tions did not restrain those successful challenges.  The second 
and third arguments are defeated because perpetuators and 
harmed individuals are identifiable by way of military and gov-
ernment official records.  Furthermore, direct causation exists 
between federally supported FHA racially restrictive policies and 
those veterans who were directly harmed by those policies.  This 
disproves the fourth argument.  Finally, compensation is easily 
calculated by using the increased value of homes financed and 
insured by FHA and VA assistance, which will be paid directly 
to veterans or their surviving spouses. 
FRAMING THE REPARATIONS ARGUMENT FOR THE      
AFRICAN-AMERICAN WORLD WAR II VETERENS 
The following presents a model by which the African-
American World War II veterans’ claim for reparations has an 
“. . . the distinction between an 
apology with payment and simple 
payment is of paramount         
importance.  The apologies by 
individuals or entities, even   
without monetary reparations, 
send a message of atonement, 
whereas offered and paid      
reparations without more seem to 
be settlements.” 
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even higher probability of success.  In  general, the paradigm 
suggests that a claim must be able to identify the victims and 
perpetuators, successfully identify causation, and ascertain dam-
ages that serve as final payment in order to fit in the individual 
rights paradigm.  Furthermore, admittedly, research has revealed 
short-comings associated with general reparations arguments.  
Nevertheless, the Japanese-American and Rosewood survivors’ 
claims succeeded because they fit tightly within the individual 
rights paradigm of the law.  The claim for African-American 
World War II Veterans does so as well.61 
In fact, there are several reasons why the Japanese-
American reparations claim was successful under the individual 
rights paradigm.  First, the Japanese-American internees’ claims 
addressed a specific executive order and ensuing military orders.  
Second, the challenge was based on then-existing constitutional 
norms.  Yet, more importantly, a congressional Commission and 
the courts identified specific facts that proved a violation of 
those norms.  Third, the claimants and the government agents 
were easily identifiable and those governmental agents’ wrong-
ful acts were the direct cause of harm, stemming from the im-
prisonment of innocent people.  Lastly, while the damages were 
uncertain, they were fixed by time and limited to survivors. 
 The claim by African-American World War II veterans also 
fits tightly within the individual rights paradigm, mirroring the 
rationale applied in claims asserted by Japanese Americans.  
First, discriminatory policies of the FHA administration and 
governmental materials62 provide tangible evidence of the dis-
crimination sought to be redressed.  Second, this challenge is 
based on then-existing constitutional norms (the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution).  In addition, the court in Shelly v. Kramer found 
that racially restrictive covenants were unenforceable,63 provid-
ing support for the proposition that factual findings prove viola-
tion of those constitutional norms.  Moreover, the government 
agents, FHA Commissioner Franklin D. Richards, the FHA ex-
ecutive board, and the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, 
are all easily identifiable as perpetuators of the wrong.64  In 
short, the perpetuators were directly responsible for the system-
atic denial of federal housing funding and insuring,65 to which 
African-American World War II veterans were entitled vis-à-vis 
the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944.66  This denial re-
sulted in wealth-advancement harm.  Lastly, the damages may 
be uncertain, but they are fixed by time (from the end of World 
War II until the issuance of Executive Order 11,063 in 1962)67 
and limited to African-American veterans of World War II or 
their surviving spouses. 
THE EQUALPROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE             
UNITED STATES CONSTITUION 
 The grant of statutory reparations is a remedy that can retro-
actively cure the effects of unlawful discrimination, whereas 
legislative measures only seek to prevent such conduct in the 
future.  In contrast, Congress has enacted numerous laws to pre-
vent discrimination and its effects.  In theory, claimants could 
use these statutory measures to claim reparations. The Four-
teenth Amendment grants equal protection under the law for all 
persons born or naturalized in the United States.68  By its terms, 
the Equal Protection Clause appears only to restrain state gov-
ernments.69 However, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process guar-
antee, beginning with the 1954 decision in Bolling v. Sharpe,70 
is interpreted as imposing the same restrictions on the federal 
government.71 
Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, African-American 
World War II veterans are entitled to a remedy for federally en-
couraged housing discrimination.  The legislature provided for 
the enactment of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 194472 
and the Constitution provides the means by which all men enti-
tled to that right are protected.73  African-American World War 
II veterans were and have always been citizens of the United 
States; thus, they should be afforded protection under its laws.  
The federal government abandoned and traded in its own Con-
stitution to subject its veterans to racially motivated housing 
discrimination.  Accordingly, the U.S. government is constitu-
tionally obligated to right this immoral abandonment of the laws 
of the Constitution by granting them equal protection under the 
law.  Reparations serve as the most effective vehicle to reverse a 
monetary loss of a constitutional right. 
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
 Although veterans were without substantial legal recourse 
to fight institutionalized discrimination during and shortly after 
the war, the Civil Rights Act of 196474 provided hope.  Subse-
quently, other legislation sought to continue the purposes set 
forth by the Civil Rights Act, including the Fair Housing Act of 
1968 which prohibited housing discrimination in the lease, sale, 
or rental of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, or national origin.75 
 The Fair Housing Act provides relief for housing discrimi-
nation in the following forms: compensatory damages, civil pen-
alties, punitive damages, injunctions, and attorney’s fees.76  
There are two types of compensatory damages, tangible and 
intangible.77  Some examples of tangible relief include “lost 
wages for time spent searching for alternative housing, the cost 
of temporary housing…and time spent preparing the case and 
attending the hearing.”  With regard to intangible loss, the ma-
jority of its claims are brought under the theory of emotional 
distress.  The two ways to establish a claim of emotional dis-
tress79 due to housing discrimination are by a complainant using 
direct testimony or the fact finder inferring emotional distress 
from the evidence even without medical evidence.80  In fact, 
case law provides a foundation for the proposition that African-
American World War II servicemen have a valid legal claim for 
reparations by asserting emotional distress as an additional fac-
tor for relief.81  Three cases provide precedent demonstrating 
that emotional distress is an intangible loss for which relief can 
be sought in claims of housing discrimination under the Fair 
Housing Act and other civil rights laws.   
 In United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
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opment (“HUD”) v. Kogut,82 the court awarded the plaintiff ten-
ant relief for emotional distress as a result of discriminatory evic-
tion due to her sex.83  The tenant was evicted after refusing a 
sexual advance made by the defendant property manager.84  The 
court found that the defendant violated the Fair Housing Act 
when he denied the plaintiff housing and caused her embarrass-
ment and temporary concern for her security.  Both amounted to 
emotional distress.85 
 Similarly, in HUD v. Lashley,86 the court awarded the plain-
tiff and her children compensatory damages for intangible losses 
due to emotional distress.87  The plaintiff and her children were 
continually harassed in their previous neighborhood.88  White 
Americans in the community called them “Niggers” and caused 
the family to fear for their lives by placing a bomb under their 
house containing a flammable liquid and wick.89  As a result of 
the constant threat and torture to their lives, the family was 
forced to move from their suitable community into a less desir-
able community.90  Pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, the court 
ordered the two perpetrators to compensate the family for their 
emotional distress due to housing discrimination (denying a 
dwelling) based on race.91 
 Finally, in HUD v. Sams,92 the court awarded the plaintiff 
compensatory relief for housing discrimination based on familial 
status. The plaintiff family was set to relocate and join the father 
in a new city until their plans were halted by a landlord who de-
cided not to rent to the family because of the number of chil-
dren.93  The plaintiff’s marriage suffered and the children be-
came distressed due to the sudden denial.94  The family was 
awarded $24,000 for emotional distress due to housing discrimi-
nation.95 
 These cases illustrate the types of discrimination against 
protected classes that warrant compensation for intangible harms 
under the Fair Housing Act.  They also provide support for the 
proposition that monetary compensation for emotional distress 
due to housing discrimination is a reality and it should be consid-
ered in this case.  Like the plaintiffs in the above cases, the Afri-
can-American World War II servicemen endured housing dis-
crimination that is prohibited by the Fair Housing Act.   They 
were discriminated against while serving in the military and 
emotionally abused after their service, as a result of being denied 
the right to federal housing assistance.  The government assumed 
that these men were not men at all under the laws of the United 
States.  For these reasons, statistical information providing proof 
of emotional distress may be unavailable, but the veteran’s emo-
tional abuse from discrimination is a reality and should be con-
sidered as an additional factor supporting a grant of reparations.     
RECOMMENDATIONS: COMPENSATING THE VICTIM   
Beginning with compensation, the statute granting repara-
tions to Japanese Americans based payment amounts on personal 
and real property loss and damages.96  Similarly, the basis for 
African-American World War II veterans’ compensation is the 
loss of real property and the damage to the wealth portfolios due 
to exclusion from federal assistance.  Opponents may argue that 
compensation for such a loss is too illusory and hard to calculate.  
However, hard evidence is available to demonstrate the increased 
value of homes that were financed and insured with federal assis-
tance.  For example, White-American homeowners who took 
advantage of FHA and VA assistance saw the value of their 
homes increase dramatically, especially when housing prices 
tripled in the 1970s.97  Thus, those locked out of the housing 
market by FHA racially restrictive covenants and who later 
sought to become first time homebuyers faced an increase in 
housing costs.98 
Calculating compensation for the loss incurred could follow 
a method created by Professor Kathleen Engel known as the 
“Calculating Lost Access to Community Method” or the “CLAC 
Method.”99  This method seeks to approximate the value of liv-
ing in a desirable community versus the value that a complainant 
of housing discrimination has incurred by obtaining housing in a 
less desirous community.100  Using the sales price differentials 
between the two homes in different communities, Engle provides 
an example of how her method would work.  She describes a 
person who sought to purchase a home for $150,000 in a good 
neighborhood versus his alternative, purchasing a home in a less 
desirable neighborhood for $100,000.101  The value of his lost 
access to the community that he originally sought to purchase a 
home in, based on the price differential, would be $50,000.  The 
complainants “opportunity cost is the discounted present value of 
the interest that he could have earned on the $50,000 if he had 
invested it in an income-generating vehicle.”102  The argument 
that not all African-American World War II veterans would have 
invested their opportunity cost fails to consider that the invest-
ment could have been made in intangible assets such as educa-
tion or wealth advancements that would have provided entry into 
aspects of society otherwise unattainable. 
Additionally, Professor Engel offers two other methods of 
calculation.  The first involves establishing the value of a com-
munity based on the difference in the size of a complainant’s 
actual interest payments.103  By applying the housing prices in 
the above example, the first step would be to calculate the dis-
counted present value of the interest the complainant actually 
would have paid on the $50,000. Next would be to compound the 
discounted present value of the interest.  This calculation would 
account for the opportunity cost that arose because the complain-
ant would not be able to invest the money that he would be 
spending on interest. In the end, the total after discounting and 
compounding would reflect the value the complainant placed on 
living in the more desirable community.104  The third method is 
to simply calculate the loss by estimating the appreciated prop-
erty value of homes that were federally financed and insured by 
the FHA and VA between the 1944 enactment of the Servicemen 
Readjustment Act105 and the 1962 Executive Order formally re-
stricting federal support of racially restrictive housing.106 
IDENTIFYING THE VICTIM   
The Japanese-American statute provided eligibility to 
“persons of Japanese ancestry detained, interned, or paroled and 
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subsequently released.”107   Likewise, African-American World 
War II veterans are easily identified as those who served in 
World War II from 1941 to 1945 or their spouse if they are de-
ceased. 
RECOMMENDED REPARATION PAYMENT DURATION 
The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 set the claim and payment 
duration for Japanese Americans in motion.108  Before enact-
ment of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, there was a payment 
duration discrepancy.  This is demonstrated by the fact that the 
original duration was supposed to last only eighteen months 
after July 2, 1948 and the actual first reparation payment in 
1991.109  To avoid such a discrepancy in future reparation pay-
ments, African-American World War II veterans should be al-
lowed to assert claims until all possible recipients are identified 
and notified of their entitlement.  A response from the veteran or 
his spouse should be required to ascertain that notification was 
achieved.  This claim process will curb common mistakes by the 
government and beneficiaries regarding administrative and hu-




The prerequisites for legal success in granting reparations to 
African-American World War II veterans who were discrimi-
nated against by the federal government are present in this case.  
Several conditions are necessary for redress.  First, legislators, 
not judges, must receive demands or claims for redress. Second, 
political pressure must be applied uniformly to the legislature. 
Freedom has no color, therefore all citizens of free America 
must pull together to support this measure.  Finally, the claim 
must present independent legal merit. 
A federally supported statute granting reparations to World 
War II veterans will educate many federally sanctioned discrimi-
nation policies in American history that need not be repeated.  
The American government must acknowledge its liabilities ad-
dressed by this article and take steps to correct the harm caused.  
The substance of this article should prevent future African-
American veterans from reliving the struggle and bitter feelings 
of those African-American World War II veterans locked out of 
governmentally encouraged communities such as Levittown.  
Our society must learn from its transgressions and honor the 
sacrifice of all African-American veterans in an effort to correct 
the past by placing the families of African-American World War 
II veterans in their rightful financial positions. 
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